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Abstract. It is generally known that the market represents the overall relationship 
between supply and demand. The relations between these two are constantly 
intertwining and are constantly influenced by different factors. Depending on their 
relationship as well as on factors specific to a particular economy, there are different 
market conditions, such as: monopoly, oligopoly, limited oligopoly, limited 
competition, perfect competition, etc. The liberalization of the domestic oil and oil 
derivatives market represents an open space for creating a high-quality competitive 
relationship. However, the course of strengthening the competitive relationship should 
be carried out considerably faster. Market conditions and competitiveness are in 
practice determined by the concentration in the observed market. Competition is in a 
particular relevant market expressed by a number of concentration indicators. Thus, 
an important aspect of the analysis of competitiveness intensity in the domestic oil 
market is measuring the concentration of supply, which will be analyzed in this paper. 
It can be said that every market is characterized by a certain level of competitiveness 
among market participants, and through these competitive relationships, their market 
power permeates. The research uses concentration indicators to show the 
concentration in the domestic oil and oil derivatives market, its current features and 
also to analyze the potential of strengthening the competitive relationship in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Oil and oil derivatives market in the Republic of Serbia is characterized by a certain 
level of competitiveness among oil companies. Through concentration and competitive 
market relations, their market power spreads out. The theoretical approach to the study of 
market power primarily starts from the market structure form, and these forms are 
numerous. There are different market structures. Most of the real market situations include 
elements, number of participants, conditions and monopoly dominance or perfect 
competitiveness. Oligopoly is one of the market situations, which in terms of number of 
participants and conditions that rule upon it, lies between monopoly and perfect 
competitiveness. It is such a market situation where there are little or few sellers who sell 
similar or slightly different products. If a product offered by oligopolists is homogeneous, 
then it is a homogeneous oligopoly. If a product offered by oligopolists is inhomogeneous, 
then there is a heterogeneous oligopoly (Zdravkovic, D., (2006); Zdravković, Stojanovic, B., 
Đorđević, D., Stojanovic I. (2004)). 
Thus, oligopoly has been a very common market situation. For instance, in the 
domestic market, the following industries are adequate examples of oligopoly - sugar 
industry, cement industry, tobacco industry, dairy industry and mobile phones industry. 
The oil market is also oligopoly. More specifically, as oil is homogeneous product, it is a 
homogenous oligopoly market. What is typical for this type of market is that companies 
that operate in this type of market in the long run generate huge profit, and often disable 
the entry of new competitors. Concentration in this kind of market represents an indicator 
of the level on which the total sales is controlled by a small number of participants and the 
high level of competitiveness in combination with low concentration level represents a 
condition to be pursued. However, the concentration in the domestic oil market is not 
uniform, thus potential competitors are facing with economies of scale, large investments 
in facilities modernization, investments, effective pricing policy of the leading companies, 
institutional and political barriers and other similar things (Horvath, 1970, 446). In 
addition to all this, one should bear in mind the experience of oligopolistic companies that 
can be manifested in their capability of considerably reducing the price of their products 
or overwhelming the market with their products, which can only discourage potential 
competitors. From the perspective of placing barriers, an oligopolistic market can act as a 
market monopoly, especially if there is a common interest and agreement among 
oligopolists in the long run. 
What is also interesting is the division of market oligopoly in terms of the distribution of the 
market share. That is how we have loose oligopoly, when four leading companies in the market 
have up to 40% market share, and tight oligopoly, the case when the four largest companies 
have 40 to 50% market share. Arrangements can be strong or long-term and short-term or 
weak, respectively. In order for an agreement to be reached, it is desirable that companies have 
similar potential, demand conditions and costs (Zdravkovic, D., (2006)). One kind of a strong 
agreement is a cartel. An adequate example of a tight oligopoly based on a cartel principle is the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
In the contemporary market economy, competition law is used to sanction the secret of 
commercial cooperation, strong and weak agreements on a joint approach with the 
intention of achieving extra profits and violation of the principle of competitiveness at the 
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expense of business competitors and consumers themselves. These activities are hard to 
detect, investigate and punish, especially in corrupt countries. Hidden and secret 
agreements are realized in the market by using different signals, for example, a competitor 
is signaling what price he prefers, and other companies follow him, in accordance with the 
previously established agreement. 
In the first part of this paper, the attention is paid to the variables on the basis of which 
the situation and changes in the domestic oil and oil derivatives market in the Republic of 
Serbia is monitored. This market is covered by oil companies. The second part of the 
paper deals with the application and presentation of metrics and also with the analysis of 
the concentration level in the domestic oil and oil derivatives market. The analysis of the 
concentration level has led to the interesting tendencies that occur in the observed market.   
1. THE TURNOVER IN THE DOMESTIC OIL AND DERIVATES MARKET 
In a market economy in the world, there are many companies that make profit and 
generate income as a dominant company in oligopoly conditions. IBM, Procter Gamble, 
General Electric, Kodak, Hewlett Packard and other companies achieve a market share of 
over fifty percent by selling their products. A quite common example is that the 
percentage of sales of products of certain companies in a particular market ranges 
between 60 and 70 percent. In Serbia, this kind of market structure is characteristic for oil 
and oil derivatives market, and the dominant company is Petroleum Industry of Serbia 
(hereinafter NIS), regarding retail sale. 
Prior to application of measurement indicators, that is the indicators and analysis of 
the level of concentration, it is necessary to choose a variable based on which the situation 
and changes in the domestic market of oil companies will be monitored. Data and 
information regarding turnover, production and costs of oil companies operating in the 
domestic oil and oil derivatives market is difficult to obtain. There are several reasons for 
this. First, Data Protection Law provides the right and obligations of oil companies to 
hold as a secret a good deal of data and pass them only to the legally competent 
institutions. Second, the non-transparency of the majority of legal and economic 
institutions also further complicate the collection and processing of necessary and 
available data. Thus, availability of the relevant data of interest for the study of business 
efficiency, concentration, competitive relations and market power is reduced to a low 
level. Objectively speaking, at that very moment, the most suitable variable is the total 
turnover of oil the company has achieved in the domestic retail market (excluding Kosovo 
and Metohia). For the purpose of identifying key trends in the oil market, an overview of 
the total turnover of fifteen oil companies operating on the territory of the Republic of 
Serbia for the period from 2010 to 2014. 
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Table 1 The total turnover of domestic oil companies during the period from 2010 to 2014 
 
Source: Business Registers Agency 
From Table 1 that depicts the annual retail turnover of the domestic oil companies, it 
is clear that NIS has the highest turnover on annual basis. The average share in total 
turnover per year ranges between 54% and 60%, which is a really big market share. The 
total turnover during the observed period had been increasing at a rate of 18%, except for 
the last year when a slight drop of 2.5% was recorded. 
 
Registered name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
ДОО ЕУРО ПЕТРОЛ 
СУБОТИЦА 
       
3,908,874 
           
5,464,054  
           
6,027,370  
           
5,635,528  
              
554,234  
ДОО ЗА ТРГОВИНУ И 
УСЛУГЕ ГАСПЕТРОЛ 
ПАНЧЕВО 
           
1,254,885  
           
1,424,032  
           
1,467,994  
           
1,239,017  
              
128,335  
ПЕТРОЛ ДОО БЕОГРАД               
945,557  
           
1,438,410  
           
2,107,860  
           
4,760,596  
           
4,554,469  
ЕУРО ПЕТРОЛ ТРАНС ДОО 
СУБОТИЦА 
              
226,891 
              
243,212  
              
233,656 
              
244,419  
              
234,971  
НАФТАХЕМ ДОО НОВИ 
САД 
           
7,684,361  
        
11,066,679  
        
17,677,041  
        
14,511,628  
        
14,525,764  
ЕВОЛУЦИЈА 2004 ДОО 
БЕОГРАД 
           
4,984,100  
           
5,401,846  
           
5,342,950  
           
6,194,219  
           
6,212,478 
РАДУН АВИА ДОО НОВИ 
САД 
           
1,507,597  
           
2,053,630  
           
2,663,442  
           
2,888,821  
           
2,457,867  
СТАНДАРД ГАС ДОО НОВИ 
САД 
           
2,842,420  
           
4,102,700  
           
5,586,532  
           
6,241,883  
           
6,457,817  
НАФТА АД БЕОГРАД            
9,422,196  
        
12,616,517  
           
5,568,006  
           
5,061,697  
           
5,002,354  
ЈП ТРАНСНАФТА 
ПАНЧЕВО 
              
484,326  
              
464,379  
              
581,967  
              
818,758  
              
658,914  
КНЕЗ ПЕТРОЛ ДОО ЗЕМУН         
18,820,128  
        
31,281,957  
        
40,369,705  
        
37,597,349  
        
38,958,899  
ЛУКОИЛ СРБИЈА АД 
БЕОГРАД 
        
37,551,658  
        
44,057,626  
        
45,154,451  
        
30,242,523  
        
33,656,847  
ИНТЕРМОЛ ДОО БЕОГРАД 
МОЛ ДОО 
        
11,430,785  
        
13,202,373  
        
18,059,526  
        
20,248,316  
        
19,850,411  
ОМВ СРБИЈА ДОО 
БЕОГРАД 
        
31,169,935  
        
34,897,696  
        
38,108,709  
        
30,937,667  
        
28,969,747  
НИС АД НОВИ САД       
161,148,850  
      
186,882,958  
      
226,156,906  
      
252,214,729  
      
239,214,757 
Total turnover in domestic 
market 
    
293,382,563  
      
354,598,069  
      
415,106,115  
      
418,837,150  
      
401,437,864  
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Table 2 Percentage share of the first seven domestic oil companies in total  
in the period from 2010 to 2014 
Registered name/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
НИС АД НОВИ САД 54.93 52.70 54.48 60.22 59.59 
ЛУКОИЛ СРБИЈА АД БЕОГРАД 12.80 12.42 10.88 7.22 8.38 
ОМВ СРБИЈА ДОО БЕОГРАД 10.62 9.84 9.18 7.39 7.22 
КНЕЗ ПЕТРОЛ ДОО ЗЕМУН 6.41 8.82 9.73 8.98 9.70 
ИНТЕРМОЛ ДОО БЕОГРАД МОЛ  3.90 3.72 4.35 4.83 4.94 
НАФТА АД БЕОГРАД 3.21 3.56 1.34 1.21 1.25 
ЈП ТРАНСНАФТА ПАНЋЕВО 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.16 
Source: Business Registers Agency 
 
Graph 1 Percentage share of the first seven domestic oil companies  
in total in the period from 2010 to 2014 
Besides the presented data about the revenue growth, and revenue from sales, far more 
valuable information relates to the tendency of concentration of market power and it can be 
obtained by analyzing the data in Table 2. Although, it is evident that the domestic oil and 
oil derivatives market is oligopoly, the available and presented data indicate that the current 
market is moving away from theoretical and classical oligopoly. In the reported period, only 
one oil industry had a share of 54% to 60% of total retail trade, while the first five realized 
87% of the turnover in the total turnover in the last five years. Table 2 and Graph 1 clearly 
show the turnover realized by large companies. They do this at the expense of smaller oil 
companies. Although there is a tendency of association among private oil companies, 
growing market power of certain oil companies is more pronounced. 
2. CONCETRATION INDICATORS IN THE MARKET AND MEASURES 
In economic theory and practice, there is a relatively widespread misconception that 
large market share automatically means great market power and violation of competitive 
relationships. This so-called traditional understanding links market power to market share, 
considering that profitable price increase is more likely to happen in companies with 
larger market share than in those who have less market share. The reason for this is the 
large market share of certain companies in the total turnover. Concentration indicators 
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show the share of every company's total turnover observed on the relevant market. On the 
basis of the market share of companies the relations among them are formed within a 
certain relevant market and the degree of concentration on the market is determined. This 
clearly shows the nature of the relationship of the observed companies. This is why 
concentration indicators are important. They describe the structure of a market and are 
often called structural indicators. As such, they are used during the implementation of the 
antitrust policy measures. The holders of the antitrust policy often rely on the calculated 
value of this indicator in order to make important decisions regarding the performance of 
certain companies in the relevant market. They enable the analysis of the current market 
conditions, taking into consideration the changes that occur in it. As such, we use them to 
predict and analyze future trends in the market. 
Assessing the relevant market involves its defining both from the geographical aspect, 
and the aspect of the product that is sold in that market. Thus, from the point of view of 
the participants industry in the particular market, we can distinguish between the relevant 
product market and the relevant geographic market. The relevant product market can be 
seen in a narrow and in a broader sense. The relevant product market in the narrow sense 
means a set of products or services for which the observed participant is specialized, for 
example - production of Euro-diesel in the domestic oil market. The relevant product 
market in the broader sense means a set of products or services for which the observed 
participant is less specialized, such as - Energy Market in the Republic of Serbia, that is 
oil and oil derivatives market, liquefied petroleum gas, oil, and lubricants. Furthermore, 
the relevant geographic market can be understood in a narrow and in a broader sense. If 
the narrower geographical area, say the territory of the city or region and wider is 
observed, then we are talking about the relevant geographic market in a narrow sense. If 
we observe the territory of a state, province or alliance of individual states, then the 
relevant geographic market in a broader sense is in question. The results of the market 
power of the company will be considered more precise if they are calculated for the 
relevant geographic market in a narrow sense, and vice versa. Setting boundaries in terms 
of product and space means defining the framework within which a competition analysis 
will be performed based on the selected variables, and the relative market power will be 
estimated. By determining the relevant market, it becomes clear which companies are 
those that compete with each other in respect of certain products offered in a particular 
geographic market become known. In the economic theory and practice, there are 
different methods by the help of which, the relevant market can be defined, and in this 
paper, the relevant market is clearly framed and defined as the retail market of oil and oil 
derivatives in Serbia. 
There are numerous concentration indicators that economists use to describe the 
degree of market restrictions in the most relevant way. The representation of the level of 
market restrictions depends on market participants and the distribution of market share, 
sales, incomes, region and other similar variables among them in one market. Otherwise, 
there are a number of indicators that provide a relative image of market concentration 
within one agricultural branch. The most important are: 
 Concentration Ratio; 
 The Herfindahl - Hirschman Index of concentration; 
 The Hannah - Kay index of Domination; 
 Index of Domination; 
 Protection of Competition in the Oil and Oil Derivates Market in the Republic of Serbia 339 
 The Hall -Tideman Index (HTI) and the Rosenbluth Index; 
 The Comprehensive Industrial Concentration Index; 
 Gini coefficient; 
 Lorenz curve; 
 Uncertainty coefficient and others. 
Taking into consideration the specificities of the of oil and oil derivatives market in 
the Republic of Serbia, the advantages and disadvantages of the statistical apparatus, as 
well as the data we have access to in order to assess concentration, it is necessary to 
affirm a few concentration indicators in order to determine the level of concentration in 
the market. This is supported by the fact that the analysis of the results of only one 
indicator does not indicate clearly the nature of the concentration of the retail market 
offers. For example, a significant disadvantage with concentration ratio represents an 
insight into the market shares of smaller companies that bypasses the calculation of this 
indicator, and certainly affects the industrial concentration. Such restrictions are and can 
be bypassed only by applying the calculation of several concentration indicators. The 
combination of several concentration indicators creates a clearer image of concentration in a 
particular market because every concentration indicator is special, but it also complements 
other indicators with its characteristics. Thus, in this paper, the analysis of the market 
concentration will be based on the use of several indicators of concentration. As seen before, 
the Concentration Ratio, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration, Uncertainty 
coefficient and Comprehensive Concentration Index have proved to be the most commonly 
used indicators. Therefore, we will use in this paper the four abovementioned indicators. 
2.1. Concentration Ratio 
Index of shares of n companies or concentration ratio (concentration coefficient) 
represents an indicator that is calculated as the sum of the market shares of n largest companies 
in the market and as such it is very easy to understand (Waldman, E., D., Jensen, J., E. (2001)). 
It can be represented using the following formula in Figure 1 (Savic, 2000, 4): 
 
Fig. 1 Concentration ratio 
   
1
n
n i
i
CR S

  (1) 
whereby Si represents market share of the i company, which is obtained through form: 
 
Fig. 2 Market share of the i company 
 100
iq
Si
Q
   (2) 
whereby qi represents the sales, that is the income of the i company, and Q is the overall 
sales at the level of branches, retail trade revenue (see Figure 2). 
The number of companies that will be included by using these indicators usually 
ranges between 4 and 10 (n=4-10), and this decision is up to specialized organs that are 
professionally engaged in monitoring the level of concentration, provided that this 
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coefficient is used as an official indicator of the limited market. It is believed that taking a 
large number of companies in the analysis can reduce the analytical significance of this 
indicator by increasing the value of the index. What ensures the objectivity of this 
indicator is choosing a small number of companies which have the most impressive 
offers, thus affecting the conditions of competition mostly. Most experts would agree with 
this, and because of that, companies whose size (income, sales, turnover) influences the 
concentration of branches are usually taken for the purpose of analysis. It is usual to take 
four companies CR4. CR4 as a concentration ratio has a value for which there are limits on 
the basis of which there is a classification of market structures. Thus, this paper will cover 
the four oil companies that we believe influence the concentration in the market mostly. 
The value of this index ranges from 0 to 100. If its value is 0, then it indicates that it is a 
market with unlimited number of companies, where the participation of each of them is 
very small, almost zero. Conversely, if its value is 100, it indicates a market monopoly, 
that is, a highly concentrated industry. In the United States and the European Union limit 
value of this ratio is more or less different, but the value that is greater than 25 generally 
involves a high degree of concentration of supply, given that in the US, highly 
concentrated market has a value above 50. 
Table 3 Concentration ratio - CR4 -  
Calculations based on data  
from Table 1 and Table 2 
Year CR4 ∆CR 
  
Graph 2 Concentration ratio - CR4 
 
2010 84.7  
2011 83.7 -0.98 
2012 84.2 0.47 
2013 83.8 -0.46 
2014 84.8 1.09 
   
The calculation of the ratio has included only four companies. The practice shows that 
if the calculation took a larger number of oil companies, concentration ratio would have 
been inaccurate and it would have lost analytical significance. Measured by the ratio in 
concentration, and by the standard both of the European Union and the United States, the 
domestic oil and oil derivatives market is characterized by extremely high concentration. 
In theory, it is also known that if the value of the concentration ratios is greater than 25, 
then we are talking about an oligopolistic market. However, if its value is between 25 and 
50 then it is a loose oligopoly, and if its value is greater than 50, a tight oligopoly is in 
question. As the value of the concentration ratios for the four companies is above 50, oil 
and oil derivatives market has the title of a tight oligopoly. Table 3 and Graph 2 showed 
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the value movement of CR4 in the domestic oil and oil derivatives market in the period 
from 2010 to 2014, whereas as the base for calculations, which were percentage market 
shares were taken from Table 2 . 
All the indicators of concentration, both in this analysis and in general, have certain 
advantages and disadvantages. For this indicator, the main drawback is that it only shows 
the total market share of the 4 leading companies in the industry, but not the dispersion of 
participation among them, which is certainly a major drawback in the detailed 
consideration of the concentration in a particular market. So, if there are 4 companies in 
the industry, its value will be 100, the same as if there is only one company. Obviously, 
when there are only 4 companies within a branch, CR4 will be set to 100, regardless of the 
layout of the market share of these four companies. So we can have CR4=100 for the 
market in which there are 4 equal sized companies (by revenue), and CR4=100 for the 
market when there is only one dominant company with a much larger market share than 
the other three. This is the reason why we will use several indicators in our analysis. 
2.2. The Herfindahl - Hirschman Index of Concentration 
The application of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration (hereinafter HHI) 
provides a clearer analysis of the observed market compared to the previous indicator. 
This index complements the concentration ratio because it takes into account the 
difference in size of market share among companies. Also, we consider all the companies 
operating within the industry into this calculation. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index represents 
the sum of market shares of the companies weighted by their own market share: 
Fig. 3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration 
 
2
1 1
( )
n n
i i i
i i
HHI W S S
 
     (3) 
whereby wi represents weighting factor and si represents market share of the i company 
 
Every company is assigned a specific weight corresponding to its market share (wi = 
si). Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a convex function of market share, and is therefore 
very sensitive to inequality in the market share distribution (see Figure 3). Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index respects market share in the industry, except that it focuses on 
companies that have higher market share, thus the bigger the number of such companies, 
the higher the growth of this index. Its value ranges from 0 to 100 or from 0 to 10,000. A 
more detailed concentration levels are given in Table 4: 
Table 4 The levels of market concentration - the value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of concentration 
Values of  HHI  Degree of supply 
HHI  < 1,000 (0.1) Low concentration of supply 
1,000 (0.10) < HHI < 1,800 (0.18)  Medium concentration of supply 
1,800 (0.18) < HHI <  2,600 (0.26) High concentration of supply 
2,600 (0.26) < HHI < 10,000 (1.00)  Very high concentration of supply 
HHI > 10,000 (1.00)  Monopoly 
Source: Market concentration, Global trends and economics, Annual report: Econometric 2009  
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Table 5 and Graph 3 illustrate the movement of HHI value in the domestic oil and oil 
derivatives market for the period from 2010 to 2014, whereby the percentage market 
share from the Table 2 were taken as the basis for calculation, that is, the percentage 
market share of seven oil companies that stood out by their turnover. 
Table 5 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
Calculations based on data  
from Table 1 and Table 2 
Year HHI/ХХИ ∆HHI/∆ХХИ 
  
Graph 3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
2010 3360.4   
2011 3133.1 -227.28 
2012 3286.1 153.02 
2013 3838.5 552.31 
2014 3793.4 -45.01 
   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration of market supply of oil and oil 
derivatives in the Republic of Serbia (without data for Kosovo) in the period from 2010 to 
2014 ranged from 3360 to 3794. An offer concentrated like this indicates that from the 
theoretical aspect, oil and oil derivatives market is characterized by a high level of the 
limited market. Based on its value, the domestic oil and oil derivatives market is classified 
as the market in which there is a very high supply concentration by the participants to the 
supply side. There is a gradual growth of this indicator, indicating the growth of 
concentration in the domestic oil market. The calculation base is taken from Table 2 - 
market share percentage and concentration coefficients are calculated from it. 
2.3. Uncertainty coefficient 
Uncertainty coefficient belongs to the information theory, whose purpose is to 
evaluate the level of certainty of every decision, and can therefore be used to measure the 
certainty or uncertainty in different market structures. Uncertainty coefficient focuses on 
the degree of instability that exists in some branches of agriculture. It is obtained through 
this form (see Figure 4): 
Fig. 4 Uncertainty coefficient 
 
1
1
log
n
i e
ii
E S
S
 
  
 
   (4) 
whereby the Si stands for market share of i company expressed in relative numbers. 
If the value of the uncertainty coefficient is zero, then the market situation is 
monopoly. A company that is monopolistic actually owns the entire market offer and 
there are no substitutes for its product. If the value of the uncertainty coefficient is equal 
to the natural logarithm of an n number, where n is the number of companies (companies 
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of the same size) in the observed market, then its value indicates that it is a market with a 
perfect competition. The uncertainty coefficient can be decomposed as the uncertainty 
coefficient within different groups, but also between different groups (Lipczynski, J., 
Wilson J. and Goddard J. (2009)). Thus, in a situation when there is a group of companies 
of different sizes, different ownership structures, various industries etc., its practical 
application comes to the fore. Uncertainty coefficient does not have an upper threshold 
value and it varies depending on the number of companies in the observed industry. 
Table 6 Uncertainty coefficient 
Calculations based on data  
from Table 1 and Table 2 
Year KE ∆KE 
  
Graph 4 Uncertainty coefficient 
2010 1.257   
2011 1.298 0.034 
2012 1.225 -0.067 
2013 1.119 -0.105 
2014 1.149 0.030 
   
Uncertainty coefficient of the domestic oil and oil derivatives market in 2010 
amounted to 1.257, while in 2014 its value was much less, amounting only 1.149. From 
Table 6 and Figure 4, we can clearly see a slight drop, whereby a significant decline was 
recorded in 2013. Gradually moving away from the coefficient upper limit (1.950) only 
indicates a further alienation of this market from perfect competition. If we take the value 
0 to stand for the market monopoly, and the value 1.950 to stand for the perfect 
competition, then the value of 1.149 clearly indicates a tight oligopoly, as the values of 
the abovementioned indicators have also confirmed. 
2.4. Comprehensive Concentration Index 
This index is also known as Horvath Index (Horvath, 1970). Comprehensive 
concentration index was created as a result of criticism of discrete and cumulative indicators 
of concentration. Some theorists have criticized this index for giving too much importance to 
large companies in the industry, while the latter was criticized for underestimating the 
importance of large companies and attributing the same importance to them as to small 
companies (Gini coefficient). This index is calculated using this simple form:  
 
Fig. 5 Comprehensive concentration index 
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whereby i=l and j = 2,3, .. n and n - a number of companies in this branch, and Si and Sj  
represent market shares of the i and j companies (see Figure 5). Also, Si represents the 
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market share of the biggest company, and Sj represents the market share of other 
companies. This index has primarily been focused on measuring imbalances in the 
distribution of market share, and is very similar to Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient and 
that is the reason why these two indicators are not used in this paper. 
Table 6 Comprehensive concentration index  
based on data from Table 1 and Table 2 
Year ССИ/СИКГ 
  
Graph 5 Comprehensive concentration index 
2010 0.61430 
2011 0.59449 
2012 0.60533 
2013 0.64299 
2014 0.64240 
  
Table 7 and Graph 5 represent the movement of index values relating to the relevant 
oil and oil derivatives market for the period from 2010 to 2014. Apart from the fall 
recorded in 2011, the index recorded a gradual growth. As the value of this index ranges 
between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect competitiveness and 1 stands for monopoly, 
the obtained values in the table for the observed period suggest that the existence of a 
tight oligopoly in the relevant market will not be changed suddenly. The potential changes 
in the market would be appearing gradually and over a longer period of time. 
For the oil and oil derivatives market as a whole, all of the applied concentration 
indicators point to the existence of concentration to some extent. Some of these indicators 
point to a strong concentration, while others at a moderate concentration. Based on 
everything abovementioned, we can conclude that there is a tendency towards increasing 
concentration in the relevant oil and oil derivatives market, but there are no credible 
evidence that there is an agreement and monopolistic treaty among participants.  
CONCLUSION 
The tendency to increase the concentration is the result of the increased commitment of 
oil companies for better business connections and better performance. Situation in the 
domestic oil and oil derivatives market can be described as oligopoly and due to the certain 
market relations, it can be characterized as tight oligopoly. Therefore, the results of this 
study suggest that there is an existence of concentration in the relevant market, thus there is a 
serious possibility for the formation of agreements and arrangements between competitors. 
Commission for Protection of Competition is fully responsible for discovering these 
arrangements. Namely, if in the near future, the flow of strengthening the concentration in 
the oil market continues or even becomes stronger, combined with the economic growth and 
living standards improvement, the abuse of a dominant position is likely to occur. 
The problem is further complicated taking into consideration all companies operating 
in the domestic oil and oil derivatives market. In the observed relevant market, there is an 
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oligopoly with the dominant firm where one company has a large market power when 
compared to their competitors in the market. As such, the practice has so far shown that 
there is a strong possibility that the company will abuse its market position towards 
suppliers, customers and competitors. This kind of situation in the domestic oil and oil 
derivatives market is subjected to the anti-monopoly policy of both domestic and foreign 
legislation. Commission for Protection of Competition should pay special attention to the 
policy of the retail price formation. Appropriate implementation of the regulation for 
forming prices in the oil and oil derivatives market is only possible under the watchful eye 
of the Commission, because the chances of an agreed performance in the relevant market 
are really big, which is supported by indicators. In this context, we draw attention to the 
potential for the agreed performance and the agreed price. 
The oil company, which is without a doubt a leader in the domestic oil and oil 
derivatives market by all accounts is Petroleum Industry of Serbia. However, NIS has 
been a state oil company until recently, so it continues to behave as a company that 
pursues a responsible policy towards the state budget and society and has not yet misused 
its dominant position. If the agreement is reached, tight oligopolies will achieve maximum 
of the common benefit that is greater than the individual ones. By connecting several 
companies, a group of common interest arises and it exceeds all the individual interests. 
Dominant companies, such as NIS, have lower production costs. They possess advanced 
technology, quality management, have been present in the market for a long time and 
have strong support from the government. Also, they have a superior product or service - 
a product that customers are familiar with for a long period of time and for some specific 
reasons they are devoted to this product. By connecting multiple companies, a group of 
common interest arises and it surpasses individual interests. 
In order for a company to become a dominant one, it is necessary to have a market share 
of 40 percent or more. Therefore, the boundary between the monopoly and oligopoly is very 
faint. The boundary is particularly poorly visible due to the fact that both with monopolists 
and the dominant firm, the demand curves and their elasticity are pretty similar, but also 
because of the imperceptibility of the competition of smaller companies. 
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Law on Protection of Competition ("RS Official Gazette", No. 
51/09) and the Decision of the Council of the Commission adopted in April 2010, Commission 
for Protection of Competition from April 2010 to September 2011 analyzed the overall 
situation of competition in the market. What was analyzed was import, processing, wholesale 
and retail trade in the domestic oil and oil derivatives market for the period 2008 to 2010. This 
analysis had a special significance because the impact of price movements of goods in the 
market in all economic areas in the Republic of Serbia was really big. Alliance for the 
Commission for Protection of Competition very quickly decided that in the future, an analysis 
of oil and oil derivatives market in the segment of retail trade and wholesale trade should be 
conducted for each preceding year. The results of continuous sectoral analysis gave statements, 
as follows: the Report on the analysis of the market situation, processing, wholesale and retail 
for the period from 2008 to 2010; the Report on the sectoral analysis of the market, wholesale 
and retail trade in oil derivatives in 2011; the Report on the sectoral analysis of the market, 
wholesale and retail trade of oil derivatives in 2012 and the Report on the sectoral analysis of 
the market, wholesale and retail trade of oil derivatives in 2013. This work, with its own results, 
clearly supports and complements certain results above mentioned. 
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ZAŠTITA KONKURENCIJE NA TRŽIŠTU NAFTE I NAFTNIH 
DERIVATA REPUBLIKE SRBIJE 
Opšte je poznato da tržište predstavlja sveukupni odnos ponude i tražnje. Odnosi ponude i 
tražnje se stalno prepliću i pod stalnim su uticajem različitih faktora.. U zavisnosti od njihovog 
odnosa i fakora karakterističnih za određenu ekonomiju javljaju se različita tržišna stanja: 
monopol, oligopol, ograničeni oligopol, ograničena konkurencija, savršena konkurencija itd. 
Liberalizacijom domaćeg tržišta nafte i naftnih derivata otvoren je prostor za izgradnju kvalitetnih 
konkurentskih odnosa. Međutim, tok jačanja konkurentnih odnosa bi trebao da se odvija znatno 
brže. Tržišna stanja i konkurentnost u praksi su determinisana koncetracijom na posmatranom 
tržištu. Konkurentnost između privrednih subjekata se na određenom relevantnom tržištu izražava 
brojnim pokazateljima koncetracije. Prema tome, važan aspekt analize intenziteta konkurencije na 
domaćem tržištu nafte jeste merenje koncetracije ponude, a što će se u ovom radu i učiniti. Može se 
slobodno reći da svako tržište karakteriše određeni nivo konkurentnosti između učesnika na tržištu, 
a kroz konkurentske odnose prožima se i njihova tržišna moć.U radu se pokazateljima koncetracije 
prikazuje kakva je koncetracija na domaćem tržištu nafte i naftnih derivata, kakve su njegove 
trenutne odlike i analizira potencijal jačanja konkurentnih odnosa u budućnosti. 
Ključne reči:  zaštita konkurencije, tržište nafte i naftnih derivata, pokazatelji koncentracije, koncetracija. 
